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Introduction
Pursuit of the notion of mathematical meaning has dominated much of the discussion to 
do with the philosophy of mathematics education. The flavour of current discussion 
generally seems opposed to notions of absolute meaning towards seeing meaning as a 
socially constructed phenomena. Such a move seems consistent with theoretical shifts in 
other academic fields but it still retains a tendency towards seeing meaning as in some 
ways independent of time and context, a notion associated with concepts rather than with 
conceiving,  a fixity to which the learner converges. In particular, any attempt to assign a 
socially conventional meaning remains problematic since any account of what this might 
be is mediated by some symbolic system subject to the interpretation of any individual 
user. 
Hermeneutics, the theory and practice of interpretation, attends to the process through 
which we develop an understanding of the world. Unlike post-structuralism which asserts 
‘a multiple play of meaning held in language’ (Urmson & Ree, 1989), hermeneutic 
understanding is more governed by a belief that whilst the world may exist independently 
of humans, it cannot present itself directly to the human gaze. The hermeneutic task can 
then be seen as an uncovering of meaning, but a meaning dependent on the media and 
experiences through which it is observed.
The principal task of this chapter is to explore the consequences of asserting that 
mathematics is an essentially interpretive activity, comprising a system of symbols that is 
only activated within individual human acts. By seeing mathematical expressions as 
being used by humans in particular situations, rather than as things with inherent 
meaning, emphasis is placed on seeing mathematical activity as a subset of social 
activity, and as such, is subject to the methodologies of the social sciences. Firstly,  I 
shall  outline some issues arising through seeing mathematical expressions as being 
necessarily contained in action, resulting in meanings that transcend mathematical 
symbolism. This is followed by a discussion of how the emergence of mathematical 
phenomena in human understanding is a consequence of a linguistic process of 
classifying. After outlining certain ideas within hermeneutics, the method is discussed as 
an approach to describing mathematical learning and assessment of this.
Speaking and writing as acting
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein (1958) suggested that the meaning of a 
word might be seen as its usage in language. Here, the notion of meaning as a phenomena 
subsides as a greater emphasis is placed on what an individual sees as being held in a 
given symbolic form in a particular time-dependent context. Within mathematics 
education this can facilitate a move away from seeing mathematics as something with an 
independent existence but rather as something that arises in the context of some particular 
social event; a style of activity rather than something to be learnt. A necessary 
characteristic of any social event however, is a style of symbolising facilitating a system 
of exchange.  In a situation concerned with mathematical learning this symbolising will 
take many forms, using both inherited and original symbols in ways that endeavour to 
enable communication between participants. So viewed mathematical utterances, both 
spoken and written, can assume many attributes associated with any linguistic utterance 
in a social space. For mathematics, it is the symbols themselves that are the material 
reality since mathematical phenomena do not have a tangible existence outside of 
symbolisation. However, the symbols are human creations that arise in speech or writing 
and are a subset of other human expressive acts and as such are subject to the 
methodology of social scientific enquiry. In particular, any issuing of a mathematical 
utterance into a social space needs to be seen as an action with a meaning that transcends 
any purely literal enquiry. 
In his work on word usage Austin (1962)  identifies three levels of effect arising from any 
sentence being uttered in a social context.  Firstly, the locutionary effect is that of  the 
literal meaning where the words are taken at  ‘face value’. Secondly, the illocutionary 
effect is that done in the utterance. For example, if I say ‘I name this ship’, the action is in 
the saying. Thirdly, the perlocutionary is that done by the sentence, for example, the 
effect on the atmosphere in a classroom as a consequence of the teacher saying something 
in a loud, disapproving tone. Ricoeur (1981) has suggested that these three effects are in a 
hierarchy according to the degree of interpretation required. The interlocutor can resolve 
the meaning of the locutionary effect by consulting a dictionary. However, to understand 
the perlocutionary effect one needs to have experience of being in the appropriate 
language using community where sentences are used alongside physical actions in a 
material environment.
In a social situation being directed towards mathematical learning, a variety of linguistic 
forms will be used within a broad communicative environment. Some of this language 
will be specifically associated with conventional mathematical ideas,  but much will be 
less precise, supporting other aspects of the exchange. The exactitude often associated 
with mathematical symbolism does not characterise the communication taking place in 
many educational situations. Rather, in most learning situations we are concerned with 
activity taking place over periods of time where learning requires making sense of 
engagement in this activity and cannot be seen as the composite of getting to grips with a 
number of clearly defined ‘mathematical’ concepts. The placing of any written or verbal 
utterance into this influences communication in the way furniture might influence 
movement around a room. In this sense,  Kaput (1991) who has explored the possibility 
of reconciling the use of inherited notations within a radical constructivist philosophy, 
has suggested that in this respect the placing of Cuisenaire rods in a particular 
arrangement might be seen as a form of writing. 
Indeed there are many forms of mathematical discourses each flavoured by their 
particular social usage. For example, a university lecturer might speak as a platonist, 
where utterances are made as if they were extracts from a transcendental world of 
mathematics. Rather different would be the speech of a representative of the National 
Curriculum Council seeing mathematics in terms of how it might be partitioned for the 
purposes of testing. Different again would be someone who regards mathematics as a 
subject whose prestige is consequential its ability to be applied in ‘real life’ situations. 
Richards (1991) offers other examples. Each of these people would enter into a dialogue 
placing varying stresses on their mathematically inclined utterances according to some 
ideological tainting. A string of symbols, no matter how neutral it may appear, cannot  be 
seen independently of the context into which it is being issued. The selection of this 
string presupposes a selecting by someone with a particular purpose.
Mathematics as a language
Can mathematics be seen as existing outside of the language that describes it? The 
question is related to the more general concern of how the world can be seen outside the 
language that describes it.  In describing perception Peirce identifies three ascending 
levels; quality (the initial sense), fact (the identification of objects), law (the relations 
between objects). Perceiving the world requires categorisation of it which involves 
differentiating and relating aspects of this world. It is towards this end we use language. 
Mathematical phenomena, those aspects of the world seen as pertaining to magnitude and 
number and the relations between them, emerge in this process, consequential to the way 
in which the world is sub-divided into categories. However, this very categorisation 
mediates and thus organises our way of seeing.
The symbols and classifications of mathematics are historically determined. They are 
arbitrary in the sense that the symbols and classifications of any language are arbitrary. 
As such it can be viewed phenomenologically in that these symbols and classifications 
have particular meanings for any individual derived from that individual’s experience of 
their usage. The field of mathematics only comes into being in its classification in 
language. The sense of this field can only be perceived retroactively and its existence 
presupposes a language. For someone learning mathematics there is a similarity with 
learning a language in that there is a need to grapple with an inherited mode of 
symbolisation and classification, arbitrarily associated with some preexisting world.   
The style of describing mathematics is necessarily interpretive according to some mode 
of signification; a particular way of fitting words and symbols to experience. Barthes 
talks of certain styles of signification becoming naturalised in the sense that they become 
the culturally conventional way that seems to be entirely neutral, in the way that a realist 
painting might be regarded as the most straightforward representational mode. This is 
discussed by Coward and Ellis (1977). However,  in learning mathematics, using 
alternatives might be seen as a way of initiating productive tensions for forcing 
awareness towards re-evaluating this supposed natural way. The linguistic overlay given 
to a situation can be seen as a way of introducing an interplay between the describing and 
that described. By asserting mathematical activity as essentially interpretive in nature, the 
production of meaning in this activity can be seen as deriving from a dialogue in a 
continuous process of introducing linguistic and symbolic form into the socially active 
space.
As an example, consider the flavours that can be given to a 4x3 rectangular lattice in the 
context of a particular activity, described in Brown (1990).
a)
           *              drawn on squared paper
                                             
 b)
           *             made out of plastic squares
c)
            *             drawn on the chalkboard
d) Captured in writing or in spoken words:
     e.g.  ‘A rectangular garden lawn surrounded by a path comprising ten square paving 
stones.’
                ‘Two green squares side by side surrounded by  red squares.’
                ‘ Four squares in the top row, four in the bottom and one at each end of the 
lawn.’
e) Located on a table      garden 1         2         3         4        5        6            n
                                                                  lawn      1         2         3          4        5        6 
n
                                                                 path       8        10         12       14     16     18 
2n+6
f) Pictured in the imagination 
Each of these metaphorical representations open up a form of describing such lattices as 
they change dimensions. The play arising from making (metaphorical) leaps between 
such forms and (metonymic) moves within such forms results in successive acts of fitting 
and associating forms. By seeing equivalences between forms we can choose the form 
most suitable for our current purposes. For example, if we see a 153x3 rectangle as the 
151st garden we do not need to build it with plastic squares and may prefer to deduce the 
information we need (e.g. how many red squares are needed for the path?) algebraically.
 
Saussure’s influential work in linguistics, carried out at the turn of the century, was 
directed at the structure of the layer mediating experience. For him the signifier is the 
mental image or sound of a word or symbol. The signified is the mental concept with 
which the individual  associates it. Together, the signifier and signified form the sign, a 
wholly mental phenomena constructed by the individual. Two forms of arbitrariness are 
implicit here. Firstly, if we take the signifier ‘square’, the word itself is quite arbitrary 
and is in fact different according to the language you are speaking (e.g. it is ‘kwadrat’ in 
Polish). Secondly, a square is a special sort of rectangle, or a type of regular hexagon, or 
a type of rhombus. It is an arbitrary category and does not need a name of its own. We 
only introduce a name for convenience since in the way in which we operate in the world 
we use it a lot. Such a category may not be so crucial for an aborigine. 
Saussure did little in investigating how such signs are associated with the real world, but 
rather saw meaning as being derived purely from the play of differences between signs. 
In this way, mathematics as a language, held in symbols, can be seen as independent of 
the real world, a mediating layer rather than a quality endemic in the physical world. So 
viewed categories of mathematics are cultural rather than transcendental, arbitrary rather 
than implicit. The play of meaning is consequential to sets of words being combined by 
humans in individual speech acts. In seeing mathematics as a language, as educators, we 
are not so much concerned with its qualities as a system (langue) but rather with its 
realisation as discourse in the social environment (parole), i.e. with the way in which it is 
being used to signify, towards producing meaning.
The phenomenology of acting and meaning
By seeing mathematics as something arising in social activity and the framing of 
mathematical statements as social actions,  we are permitted the possibility of employing 
social scientific techniques towards establishing mathematical understanding. Much 
recent  work in the human sciences has worked from the premise that the individual 
human subject perceives the world phenomenologically, that is, s/he sees the world 
comprising phenomena having particular meanings to him or her in particular contexts. 
Here individual objects are not seen as having meaning in themselves but only take on a 
meaning in the gaze of the individual who sees them from his or her own particular 
position and according to his or her current interest. 
Underlying this view are specialised uses of the terms objective and subjective. Whilst 
there may be an independent material reality it only comes into a meaningful ‘objective’ 
reality when classified within the language of an individual human subject. I might talk 
about the situation I see myself in, as if it were independent of me, but I can only do this 
only after experiencing myself as part of it. In this way object and subject are in some 
sense part of each other. An object can only present itself to the gaze of the individual 
subject with his or her own particular phenomenology. The world of material objects only 
comes into being retroactively through being captured in language.  An individual’s 
consciousness is always a consciousness of... and is always intentional insofar as it seeks 
to make sense of that within its gaze according to some schema. A consciousness is 
always of an object and an object only presents itself to a consciousness. The nature of 
the objective is dependent on the way in which it is captured and accounted for in 
language by the subject. The mediating layer through which language is derived seems 
inescapable, brought into existence by consciousness itself and its need to organise that 
which it perceives. These ideas, generally accredited to Husserl, are discussed at length 
by Ricoeur (1966).
In making a mathematical statement I express certain intentions but am unable to 
guarantee that I communicate the meaning I myself attach to this statement. Such an 
action and its meaning to me are consequential to my categorisation of the world  in 
which I see myself as part. Whilst I may attempt to predict how my action might be read 
by others the meaning of my action cannot be seen only in terms of my intention since it 
cannot be seen independently of the social environment into which it is issued. In 
addressing this Ricoeur (1966) differentiates between the ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ 
components of any action. The individual subject can assert him or herself through the 
voluntary component of an action, i.e. that which he or she intends. The meaning of this 
action, however, only emerges as the resistances to this action take shape around it. These 
resistances, the involuntary component of the action, have no meaning in themselves, but 
rather are the contextual framing activated by the voluntary component. This implies a 
hermeneutic process where the subject voluntarily acts in the world he or she supposes it 
to be, but this in turn gives rise to (involuntary) resistances which are always at some 
distance from those anticipated. In order to act, however, there is a need for the subject to 
suspend doubt and act as if his or her reading is correct.  This has been discussed in more 
depth by Brown (in press).
In later work, Ricoeur (1981) talks of the ‘meaningful effect’ of an action as being its 
‘objectification’; the mark it leaves on time. Thompson (1981), Ricoeur’s translator, sees 
this as being related to the way in which the action might be described in retrospect, as if 
in some historical account. Ricoeur explores this in terms of an analogy with the 
objectification speech goes through in being committed in writing. By pursuing the 
paradigm of text interpretation he sees acting as analogous with writing and interpretation 
of this action as reading. It is through this sort of fixation that we can employ techniques 
of interpretation for both tasks of understanding (learning through signs) and of 
explanation (learning through facts), by seeing such tasks as necessarily inter-twined. It is 
this relation between understanding and explanation that hermeneutic enquiry seeks to 
unfold. 
Hermeneutic understanding
Hermeneutics was originally developed and employed in the analysis of biblical texts but 
was extended, largely by Dilthey working at the turn of the century, to cover the whole of 
human existence. Leading modern exponents are Ricoeur and Gadamer who have 
developed it within phenomenology.  Hermeneutics, whilst acknowledging that some 
interpretations are better than others recognises that none is ever final.  Hermeneutical 
understanding never arrives at its object directly; one’s approach is always conditioned 
by the interpretations explored on the way. While one’s understanding may become 
‘fixed’ in an explanation for the time being such fixity is always contingent.  In choosing 
to act as if my explanation is correct,   the world may resist my actions in a slightly 
unexpected way, giving rise to a new understanding, resulting in a revised explanation, 
providing a new context for acting and so on. This circularity between explanation and 
understanding, termed the hermeneutic circle, is central to hermeneutic method.
Hermeneutics resists distinctions frequently made between the explanations of the natural 
sciences (knowing through facts) and the understanding of the human sciences (knowing 
through signs), preferring to see them both as subject to an interpretive framework. 
Within history, for example, whilst it may be possible to continue offering ever more 
interpretations of ‘what happened?’ if we are to act in the light of this knowledge we have 
to suspend doubt for the time being and  assume a certain position towards get things 
done. Conversely, taking mathematics, as an example from the other end of this scale, 
while we may have statements that ‘on the surface’ seem entirely incontrovertible, it is 
still necessary for an individual human to decide how such statements will be used in the 
social space or how they have been used. This is discussed in relation to mathematics 
teaching in Brown (1991).
In speaking of mathematics I cannot simply quote, in a neutral way, expressions as if 
from some platonic formulation. I am necessarily acting in time - whereas platonic 
mathematics is outside of time. Further, in doing this I refer, by implication (through the 
perspective I reveal), to myself, to the world I see, and  to the person(s) to whom I am 
talking. Ricoeur (1981) emphasises these discursive qualities of language usage in 
distinguishing langue and parole. In doing this he combines Saussure’s linguistics with 
the speech acts described by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969).  Mathematics is only 
shareable in discourse and the act of realising mathematics in discourse brings to it much 
beyond the bare symbols of a platonic formulation of mathematics. The mathematics I 
intend to communicate is always mediated by the explanatory procedures of such a social 
event. My interlocutor is obliged to interpret my speech, reconciling parts with the whole, 
stressing and ignoring as he or she sees fit. The distinction between knowing through 
facts and knowing through signs  becomes blurred in this process since the facts of 
mathematics are immersed in the usage of them. The expressions of mathematics are only 
arising within actions in social events
Notions of hermeneutic understanding as applied to mathematics then require a shift in 
emphasis from the learner focussing on mathematics as an externally created body of 
knowledge to be learnt, to this learner engaging in mathematical activity taking place 
over time.  Such a shift locates the learner within any account of learning that he or she 
offers, thus softening any notion of a human subject confronting an independent object. 
In this way positivistic descriptions that draw hard distinctions between process and 
content of learning mathematics are avoided since there is no end point as such but rather 
successive gatherings-together of the process so far, seen from the learner’s perspective. 
In such an educative space, characterised by the communication of mathematical 
thinking, the introduction of different interpretations gives rise to the possibility of a 
productive tension between mathematical activity and accounts of it, enabling the very 
hermeneutic process of coming to know through juxtaposing varying perspectives as in 
the example above. 
The exact expressions conventionally associated with mathematics only ever find 
expression in such activity, within the context of many other sorts of expression. Such 
statements are always, in a sense, offered as part of a distillation  process; a ‘looking 
back’ concerned with pinning down key points of the event. The reflective dimension 
inherent in this results in the active generation of mathematical expressions through time 
being part of the reality described.  Similarly, the intention to learn is always associated 
with some presupposition about that to be learnt and learning is in a sense revisiting that 
already presupposed. This continual projecting forwards and backwards affirms an 
essential time dimension to mathematical understanding that can never be brought to a 
close by an arrival at a ‘concept’, since the very framing of that concept modifies the 
space being described.
Where then lie conventional notions of mathematical understanding? This issue seems 
problematic in that within hermeneutics understanding does not pertain to concepts with 
fixed meanings. Understanding is a process rather than a state. This clearly runs in 
conflict with sublime notions of understanding that suggest a state beyond that 
accountable in words. A more humble notion of mathematical understanding may be that 
it is simply the ability to tell a package of convincing stories generated by the learner 
himself or borrowed from the teacher. Further, this understanding is only proven if the 
learner can make use of certain aspects of the conventional, inherited system of 
exchange.
Describing and assessing mathematical learning
As educators we are often not so much concerned with learning as with giving an account 
of learning. This might be the reproduction of a famous result, the application of a 
method in a particular real life situation or some verbal explanation of some work 
completed. Such an account is necessarily in some symbolic order associated with some 
over-arching system of exchange. For the student engaging in a mathematical activity 
there are a variety of ways of reporting back on the experience. The nature of any 
understanding demonstrated in this report, however,   is always conditioned by the 
method of reporting chosen. But what can be captured in such a report? Is it the 
mathematics, the understanding, the activity?  None of these can be described purely 
within the realm of mathematics, whatever that is. Some perspective of the describer is 
required and this depends on his position, his biographically defined background and his 
current motives.
By seeing the assessment of mathematics being directed towards the student  making 
sense of his mathematical activity we overtly move in to the realm of interpretations. 
Assessment by the teacher can be directed towards participation in a dialogue involving 
the student in generating linguistic forms in respect of his view of the activity. A two-
tiered interpretation is implied here; the student capturing his experience in  symbolic 
form, and the teacher assessing this symbolic product as evidence of understanding. What 
is not implied here is any notion of a universal meaning to which both teacher and student 
converge,  but rather  ‘..objectivity is achieved through the coincidence of interpreting, 
that is, agreeing’ (Brookes, 1977)).
One might legitimately protest that there is a certain power relation here that creates a 
somewhat asymmetrical sort of agreeing, where the teacher, as representative of the 
conventional way of talking about things, sees her task as introducing this. Whilst the 
child may have the opportunity of offering some account of their understanding, within 
their own mode of signifying, the teacher, in entering any discussion, introduces a more 
conventional mode. The communication being sought in such an exchange brings into 
play some symbolic medium, comprising symbols, actions and words. But such is the 
power of the conventional mode of discourse that  the quest for the learner may be to 
believe that he is joining the teacher in using the inherited language. This highlights a 
particular aspect of the teacher’s power, consequential to the linguistic overlay she brings 
to the situation. The teacher’s style of looking is accustomed to spotting concepts which 
are, after all, merely culturally conventional labellings. In this way the teacher’s way of 
making sense of a student’s work involves classifying this work as if looking to tick off 
categories on a National Curriculum checklist. The student’s access to any notional 
transcendental mathematics is always mediated by a social pressure to capture this in the 
categories arbitrarily assigned by our ancestors. I would argue that much investigational 
work, such as that described in Brown (1990), permits the student to develop their style 
of signification more fully, prior to interception by the teacher introducing more 
conventional ways of describing the product, than might be possible in more traditional 
approaches. 
Concluding comments
By accepting a hermeneutic view of mathematical understanding we give primacy to the 
linguistic qualities of mathematical learning and so soften the distinction between 
mathematics and other disciplines. Mathematics becomes something held in the 
expressions of participants in mathematical activity, who are asserting their view of, and 
their relation to, some supposed mathematics.  The reality of any  transcendental 
mathematics relies on people acting as if it is there. The assertion that mathematics has no 
existence outside the material symbols that describe it echoes the ‘lack’ that Lacan 
describes as emerging after the layers of description are peeled away (Brown, Hardy and 
Wilson, 1993). Whilst this may be too extreme for many professional mathematicians, 
the transcendental mathematical truth that might be uncovered by hermeneutic enquiry 
cannot escape some flavouring from the process through which it is reached by the 
individual.
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